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MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONs-FINANcIAL PoWERS--PoWER To EXPEND Pu:s-

FUNDs IN Am OF INDUSTRY-Taxpayers and voters of Frostburg, Maryland, sought to restrain the holding of an election under enabling legislation to obtain authority both to issue municipal bonds and to devote the
proceeds to acquiring a site and contributing to the cost of construction of
a building for sale to a private manufacturing company. The chancellor
issued an injunction against the holding of such election on the ground
that the enabling act, in authorizing the use of public funds for private
purposes, was unconstitutional. On appeal, held, reversed. The location of
new industry in furnishing employment and increasing the financial wellLIC
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being of the community serves a "public purpose." City of Frostburg v.
Jenkins, (Md. 1957) 136 A. (2d) 852.
As a general rule, public funds of municipalities cannot properly be
devoted to private use. Taxation for such purposes is equally invalid. Since
the power to issue bonds, other than revenue bonds, implies the power
to satisfy those obligations through taxation, the "public purpose" doctrine
places a limitation on the purposes for which bonds may be issued.1 As
originally laid down, this doctrine rested on neither state nor federal
constitutional grounds; 2 but it is now recognized to be embodied in many
state constitutions as well as the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.3 Difficulty arises from the fact that the decisions are not uniform in their concepts of "public purpose." The doctrine, as applied to
the case of municipal aid to private industry, has been characterized by a
gradually expanding definition of public purpose. Originally, public aid
to private industry was limited to railroad corporations.4 However, early
recognition by the Supreme Court that concepts of "public purpose" may
be expanded in light of changing economic conditions15 set the stage for
a far broader application of the doctrine. 6 In 1938, Mississippi legislation
authorizing municipal aid to private manufacturing companies was upheld on the ground that it was pursuant to a plan to balance agriculture
with industry which was a public purpose.7 Although many cases continue
to question the constitutionality of municipal aid to private corporations,8

15 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 3d ed., §39.19 (1949).
Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. St. 147 (1853). See also Loan Assn. v.
Topeka, 20 Wall. (87 U.S.) 655 (1874).
3 Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U.S. ll2 (1896); Jones v. Portland,
245 U.S. 217 (1917). See 47 YALE L. J. 1412 (1938); McAllister, "Public Purpose in
Taxation," 18 CALIF. L. REv. 137, 241 (1930).
4 Lowell v. Boston, Ill Mass. 454 at 461 (1873), where the court stated: "The
incidental advantage to the public, or to the state, which results from the promotion
of private interests, and the prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not
justify their aid by the use of public money raised by taxation, or for which taxation
may become necessary." See Hn.LHOUSE, MUNICIPAL BONDS 143-199 (1936) and note following Zigler v. Menges, 121 Ind. 99, 22 N.E. 782, in 16 Am. St. Rep. 365 (1889), for examples
of public and private purposes; 14 AL.R. 1151 (1921).
5 Jones v. Portland, note 3 supra (holding that the use of public funds to maintain
a public yard for the sale of wood and coal was for a public purpose).
6 Finan v. Cumberland, 154 Md. 563 at 565, 141 A. 269 (1928), where the court
stated: "What is a public purpose for which public funds -may ,be expended is not a
matter of exact definition; it is almost entirely a matter of general acceptance." Jacksonville v. Oldham, ll2 Fla. 502, 150 S. 619 (1933). See 5 MICH. L. REv. 1383 (1952); Fernandina v. State, 143 Fla. 802, 197 S. 454 (1940) (holding that securing employment for
1000 people is a public purpose).
7 It was emphasized that unemployment was high, the enabling act provided it was
for a public purpose, and the city was to have a measure of control over the corporations.
Albritton v. Winnona, 181 Mis.s. 75, 178 S. 799, app. dismissed 303 U.S. 627 (1938). See
ll2 A.L.R. 571 (1938); 12 TULANE L. REv. 645 (1938).
s Nash v. Town of Tarboro, 227 N.C. 283, 42 S:E. (2d) 209 (1947); Azbill v. Lexington
Mfg. Co., 188 Tenn. 477, 221 S.W. (2d) 522 (1949).
1
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since 1938 broader application of the "public purpose" doctrine has been
justified on the basis of legislative determination9 or judicial judgment10
that economic conditions necessitate such aid. In addition, the courts have
indicated greater willingness to uphold such aid when the funds used by
the city in aid of a private company are received from a bond issue not
supported by the general credit of the city.11 The decision in the principal
case seemingly gives a more liberal construction to the "public purpose"
doctrine than any prior case. The court neither requires a legislative
determination that the enabling act was for a public purpose nor discusses
any peculiar economic conditions making such aid necessary. In addition,
the bonds to be issued are payable out of the general credit of the city. As
historically applied, the "public purpose" doctrine has been all but done
away with by the Maryland court. But it is today self-evident that industry,
in furnishing employment, promotes the growth and increases the financial
well-being of a community. It does not seem unreasonable that the Maryland court should take judicial notice of these facts, and declare municipal
aid to a private corporation, for the purpose of securing new industry, a
"public purpose." In reaching its decision, the Maryland court construed
the state constitutional provision12 prohibiting the use of state credit in
aid of an individual, association, or corporation to be inapplicable to cases
where the court finds such credit is extended for a public purpose.1 3 Constitutional restrictions such as the Maryland provision14 were enacted to
put an end to the use of public credit in aid of private enterprise.15 Some
courts have avoided the impact of the constitutional limitations by holding
that such provisions restrict only the states and have no effect on munici-

9 Faulconer v. Danville, 313 Ky. 468 at 472, 232 S.W. (2d) 80 (1950), where the court
stated: "The legislative determination of what is a public purpose will not be interfered
with by the courts unless the judicial mind conceives it to be without reasonable relation
to the public interest or welfare and to be without the scope of legitimate government."
Miller v. Police Jury of Wash. Parish, 226 La. 8, 74 S. (2d) 394 (1954).
10 Dyche v. London, (Ky. 1956) 288 S.W. (2d) 648 at 650, where the court stated
that the validity of giving aid to private industry "depends entirely upon the existence
of underlying economic conditions which render the project essentially one of a 'public'
nature. We think the city must establish with clear and convincing proof that such
conditions exist."
11 The most typical situation is where the bond issue is payable solely from the
rent of a city purchased building; Faulconer v. Danville, note 9 supra; Holly v. Elizabeth.ton, 193 Tenn. 46, 241 S.W. (2d) 1001 (1951). -But see State v. North Miami, (Fla. 1952)
59 S. (2d) 779; State ex rel. Beck v. York, 164 Neb. 223, 82 N.W. (2d) 269 (1957).
12 MD. CONST., art 3, §34.
13 It is significant that the city adduced no evidence on this point. Compare note
10 supra.
14See GRAY, LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWER 140-157 (1906).
15 State and municipal governments had been making such reckless expenditures
in aid of private railroad corporations •that heavy burdens of debt and taxation had
resulted to the people. See HILLHOUSE, MUNICIPAL BONDS 143-199 (1936); Johns Hopkins
University v. Williams, 199 Md. 382, 86 A. (2d) 892 (1951).
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palities.16 Others have preferred to reason that, since the revenue from
municipal bonds loaned in aid of private interests is not the lending of
credit, the constitutional restrictions should not apply.17 Most courts have
refused to accept either of these theories, however, but recent cases have
shown a tendency to bypass the constitutional restrictions where there is
a clear showing by the municipality of a primary public purpose to be
served, 18 where the private enterprise to be aided directly serves the public,19 or where the general credit of the city is not liable for repayment of
the money given or loaned.20 In not requiring direct proof of a primary
public purpose to be served, the principal case has apparently gone one
step farther in defeating the operation of the constitutional provision.

Paul K. Gaston

16 The court in the principal case indicated that they preferred this view but
placed the decision on other grounds. Pattison v. Board of Supervisors of Yuba County,
13 Cal. 175 (1859); contra, State ex rel. Beck v. York, note 11 supra.
17 Grout v. Kendall, 195 Iowa 467, 192 N.W. 529 (1923); contra, Jarrolt v. Moberly,
103 U.S. 580 (1881); William Deering & Co. v. Peterson, 75 Minn. 118, 77 N.W. 568 (1898).
18 Dyche v. London, note 10 supra (holding that relief to private manufacturing
companies to relieve serious unemployment is not a violation of the constitutional
restrictions).
19 Johns Hopkins University v. Williams, note 15 supra (upholding municipal aid to a
private educational institution); Pipes v. Hilderbrand, 110 Cal. App. (2d) 645, 243 P. (2d)
123 (1952) (upholding municipal aid to a privately owned air terminal).
20 Newberry v. Andalusia, 257 Ala. 49, 57 S. (2d) 629 (1952); Village of Deming v.
Hosdreg Co., 62 N.M. 18, 303 P. (2d) 920 (1956); contra, State v. North Miami, note 11
supra; State ex rel. Beck v. York, note 11 supra.

